Michigan Law Review
Volume 94

Issue 5

1996

Are Credit-Card Late Fees "Interest"? Delineating the Preemptive
Reach of Section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864 and Section
521 of the Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980
Kevin G. Toh
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin G. Toh, Are Credit-Card Late Fees "Interest"? Delineating the Preemptive Reach of Section 85 of the
National Bank Act of 1864 and Section 521 of the Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1294 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Are Credit-Card Late Fees "Interest"? Delineating the
Preemptive Reach of Section 85 of the National Bank
Act of 1864 and Section 521 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980
Kevin G. Toh

INTRODUCTION

After the expiration of the Second Bank of the United States in
1836, for nearly three decades, only the states were in the business
of chartering and regulating banks. The need to finance the Civil
War revived the interest in national banks and prompted Congress
in 1863 to pass a bill to create a national banking system. Congress
extensively revised and re-enacted the measure in June of the following year.1
Section 85 of the resulting National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA)2
sought to protect the newly established national banks from the
state legislatures' probable discrimination by conferring on national
banks the so-called most favored lender status. According to the
"most favored lender" doctrine, NBA section 85 gives a distinct advantage to national banks over their state-chartered counterparts
by enabling national banks located3 in any state to charge the highest rate that any state-chartered lender in that state may charge for
the same class of loans.4 By allowing national banks sitting in any
1. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND PoUTics IN AMERICA 723-24, 727, 731 (1957).
2. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1994)). Section 85
of the NBA, as originally worded, read:
[E]very association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made,
or upon any note, bill of exchange or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed
by the laws of the state or territory where the bank is located, and no more, except that
where by the laws of any state a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized
under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized in any
such state under this act.
Ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)) (emphasis
added). This provision was originally § 30 of the NBA. For simplicity's sake, it is referred to
as § 85 throughout this Note.
3. For purposes of NBA § 85, a bank is "located" either in the place designated in its
"organizational certificate" or in the places in which it has established authorized branches.
See Marquette Natl. Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 309 n.21 (1978) (citing
Citizens & S. Natl. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977)).
4. The nature of national banks' special status was not initially obvious. The confusion
stemmed mainly from the "except" clause in § 85. For the original text of § 85, see supra
note 2. It was unclear whether national banks located in a state were limited to charging
interest only at the rates that state banks were allowed to charge under the laws of that state
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state to "borrow" the interest rates that the most favored lenders of
that state are allowed to charge, Congress, in effect, preempted
state interest-rate laws that otherwise would apply to credit transactions of national banks.
The enactment in 1980 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA)5 extended the scope of the
most favored lender doctrine. Section 5216 of the DIDA was aimed
at creating a competitive, level playing field between national banks
and state banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
(FDIC). To achieve this end, Congress duplicated the language of
NBA section 85 in wording DIDA section 521 and thus extended
the most favored lender status to FDIC-insured state banks.7
In Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., s a
case decided two years prior to the passage of the DIDA, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that, under section 85 of the
NBA, national banks located in one state may charge interest at the
rate authorized by the laws of that state even on transactions with
residents of another state.9 In addition, although it did not directly
consider the issue of the most favored lender doctrine, the Court
implicitly reaffirmed the doctrine. 10 The net result of the decision
or at higher rates if the Jaws of that state allowed other nonbank lenders to charge higher
rates.
The Supreme Court opted for the latter interpretation in Tiffany v. National Bank, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 {1873). The Tiffany Court stated that§ 85 of the NBA "gives advantages
to National banks over their State competitors. It allows such banks to charge such interest
as State banks may charge, and more, if by the laws of the State more may be charged by
natural persons." 85 U.S. {18 Wall.) at 413. Tiffany thus established the "most favored
lender" doctrine. For other, equally plausible, interpretations of § 85, see Coreen S. Arnold
& Ralph J. Rohner, The "Most Favored Lender" Doctrine for Federally Insured Financial
Institutions - What are its Boundaries?, 31 CATii. U. L. REV. 1, 5-8 {1981)..
5. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 {1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C.).
6. See Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat 132, 164-65 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 183ld{a) {1994)).
7. DIDA § 521 "inherited" from NBA § 85 the judicial interpretation of the language of
§ 85, including Tiffany and its progeny. When a statute adopts language from an older statute, the judicial interpretation of that language is also transplanted to the new statute. See
Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).
Although its language otherwise closely tracks that of NBA § 85, § 521 of the DIDA does
not duplicate the "except" clause of NBA § 85 which originally led the Supreme Court to
fonnulate the most favored lender doctrine in Tiffany. See supra note 2. However, § 521
begins with the words, "In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions," 12 U.S.C. § 183ld{a) (1994), and the goal of DIDA § 521 to achieve
a competitive, level playing field between national and FDIC-insured state banks could not
be achieved without conferring on the latter banks the most favored lender status.
8. 439 U.S. 299 {1978).
9. See 439 U.S. at 313.
10. See 439 U.S. at 314 & n.26. The Marquette Court cited Tiffany with approval and also
noted that the most favored lender doctrine had been incorporated into the regulations of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), see 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1995). Congress created the OCC to oversee the enforcement of the NBA. See ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99100 (1864) {codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).
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in Marquette is that national banks sitting in one state may "export"11 the most favored lender rates allowed by the laws of that
state to residents of other states. Furthermore, Congress's duplication of the language of NBA section 85 in DIDA section 521 means
that the Marquette holding gives the same privilege to FDICinsured state banks.
Taking their cue from Marquette, many banks in the early 1980s
moved their credit-card operations to a few states - such as
Delaware, Nebraska, and South Dakota - that had raised or removed interest-rate ceilings and relaxed other consumer-creditprotection laws in order to attract banks and thereby generate revenues. Marquette thus has enabled banks to conduct their nationwide consumer-credit transactions from very favorable
environments. The decision also has put pressure on legislatures in
other, less accommodating states to repeal or relax their own interest-rate limits in response to threats by banks to move their creditcard operations elsewhere.12
From their protected environments, the credit-card-issuing
banks have aggressively conducted their nationwide consumercredit transactions. These banks, in the process, have been ignoring
not only the laws of various states dealing specifically with interest
rates - laws that have been preempted expressly by NBA section
85 and DIDA section 521 - but also other state consumer-creditprotection laws. Marquette thus has created a regulatory scheme in
which a few states with the weakest consumer-protection laws can
veto the consumer-protection laws of other states and dictate the
terms by which consumers in all fifty states buy credit. This is a
troubling result given that consumers in Massachusetts or Colorado
are unable to lobby in the legislative halls of Delaware or South
Dakota.
A series of class-action suits in recent years has challenged the
assumption, widely held by banks, that the preemptive reach of
NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 extend beyond state
interest-rate laws, to various state consumer-credit-protection laws.
In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 13 a federal district court
in Massachusetts ruled that an FDIC-insured, Delaware-chartered
bank cannot impose late fees14 as permitted by Delaware law on
11. 439 U.S. at 314.
12. See, e.g., Tony Munroe, Virginia Law Change Attracts Credit Card Companies, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at Cl; see also David Conn, Key Federal Shifting Credit Card Unit to
Delaware Official Blames Md. Restrictions, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16, 1993, at 9C.
13. 776 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 1991), revd., 971 F.2d 818 {1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1052 (1993).
14. cardmember agreements usually stipulate that the card holder must make a minimum monthly payment, calculated from time to time by reference to the balance outstanding. Failure to make this payment in a timely fashion constitutes default. A late fee is
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credit-card transactions with residents of Massachusetts because of
a Massachusetts usury-law provision prohibiting such fees. A year
later, the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding
that section 521 of the DIDA preempted the Massachusetts usury
law regulating late fees as well as Massachusetts's cap on numerical
percentage rates of interest.15 The First Circuit's decision, however,
did not stem the tide of state-law-based consumer class-action suits
filed across the country against both national and FDIC-insured
state banks issuing credit cards.16 As the First Circuit recognized, 17
the ultimate issue at stake in these lawsuits is the delicate and increasingly uncertain balance between the regulatory powers of the
federal government and the states in our dual banking system.18
This Note argues that neither section 85 of the NBA nor section
521 of the DIDA preempts state consumer-credit-protection laws
regulating late fees on credit-card transactions. Part I discusses the
three approaches that the Supreme Court has devised and used
over the years to determine when a federal law preempts state law:
express preemption, implied preemption, and conflict preemption.
Part II applies express preemption analysis and asserts that the ordinary meaning of DIDA section 521's express preemption language does not evince Congress's intent to preempt state
prohibitions of late fees. Part III applies implied preemption analysis and argues that neither NBA section 85 nor DIDA section 521
impliedly preempts state laws regulating late fees because Congress
did not indicate a clear and manifest purpose to preempt the entire
field of consumer-credit protection. Finally, Part IV applies conflict
assessed upon such a default or when the default is not cured within a designated period of
time.
15. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
16. So far, the majority of courts dealing with the question of credit-card late fees have
followed the First Circuit's Greenwood ruling. See Ament v. PNC Natl. Bank, 849 F. Supp.
1015 (W.D. Pa. 1994), affd. in part, revd. in part sub nom. Spellman v. Meridian Bank, No. 943203, No. 94-3204, No. 94-3215, No. 94-3216, No. 94-3217, No. 3218, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
37149 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 1995); Tikkanen v. Citibank, N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270 (D. Minn. 1992);
Harris v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (Ct. App. 1994); Smiley v.
Citibank, N.A., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 1994), affd., 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995), cert.
granted No. 95-860, 1996 WL 18433 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996); Stoorman v. Greenwood Trust Co.,
888 P.2d 289 {Colo. Ct. App. 1994), affd., No. 94SC382, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 764 (Dec. 18,
1995); Copeland v. MBNA Am., N.A., 883 P.2d 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), affd., 907 P.2d 87
(Colo. 1995); Siemientkowski v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., No. 66531, 1994 WL 663483
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994).
By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania superior courts have
held that neither NBA § 85 nor DIDA § 521 supplants state laws regulating credit-card late
fees. See Sherman v. Citibank, N.A., 1995 N.J. LEXIS 1355 (Nov. 28, 1995); Hunter v.
Greenwood Trust Co., 1995 NJ. LEXIS 1354 (Nov. 28, 1995); In re Citibank Credit Card
Litigation, 653 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. Ct.1995); Gadon v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 653 A.2d 697
{Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Mazaika v. Bank One, 653 A.2d 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
17. See Greenwood, 971 F.2d at 821.
18. For a discussion of the "dual banking system," see infra Part III.
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preemption analysis and argues that sustaining state law provisions
governing late fees, which are imposed only on contingent occasions of borrower default, does not conflict with the congressional
objective in enacting NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521
achieving lender parity.
I.

AN OVERVIEW
19
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Congress can preempt state laws when acting within its delegated powers.20 The
Supreme Court, over the years, has devised and used three types of
preemption analysis.21 First, a federal law expressly preempts a
state law when Congress has expressed unmistakably its intent to
occupy an entire field of regulation by explicit preemptive language.22 A federal law impliedly preempts a state law when Congress's intent to occupy an entire subject area can be inferred from
the character and objective of the federal law.23 Finally, even when
a federal statute does not occupy an entire field of regulation, a
particular state law is supplanted by a confUct preemption when the
state law stands as an obstacle to the full execution of the objectives
of the federal law.24
THREE TYPES OF PREEMPTION ANALYSES:

19. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
("[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 'any state
law ... which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'" (citations omitted));
see also GERALD GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 291 (12th ed. 1991) ("When Congress
exercises a granted power, the federal law may supersede state laws and preempt state authority, because of the operation of the supremacy clause of Art. VI.").
21. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Commn., 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (providing a taxonomy of preemption analyses).
22. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992). Morales involved
§ 1305(a)(l) of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 which expressly prohibited states from
"enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.'' 504 U.S. at 383
(quoting § 1305(a)(l)). The Court's construction of the phrase "relating to" led it to conclude that § 1305(a)(l) preempted state guidelines regarding airline-fare advertising. See 504
U.S. at 384.
23. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Burbank
involved a city ordinance that imposed a curfew on jet flights from the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport. The Court held that the ordinance was preempted impliedly because the "pervasive
control vested in EPA and in FAA under the [Noise Control Act of 1972] •.. leave[s] no
room for local curfews or other local controls.'' 411 U.S. at 638.
24. See, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 88. The Gade Court observed that, in enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Congress intended to subject employers and employees to
only one set of regulations. See 505 U.S. at 102-03. The Court therefore held that Illinois's
laws regulating training, testing, and licensing of hazardous-waste-site workers were preempted because they conflicted with the objectives of the federal law. See 505 U.S. at 103.
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In all three cases, whether a federal law preempts a state law is a
question of congressional intent25 and hence largely a matter of
statutory construction.2 6 The particulars of each case determine
which of the three types of preemption analysis provides the best
means to fathom the congressional intent. It follows that a state
law does not escape the full preemptive reach of a federal law by
surviving any one type of preemption analysis. In the following
Parts, the preemptive scopes of NBA section 85 and DIDA section
521 are examined under each type of preemption analysis.27
II.

EXPRESS PREEMPTION

This Part argues that the express preemption provision of DIDA
section 521 does not indicate a congressional intent to displace state
laws prohibiting credit-card late fees. DIDA section 521, unlike
section 85 of the NBA, contains an express preemption provision.
The relevant portion of section 521, as amended, states:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institutions ... with respect to interest rates, if the applicable
rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such State bank ...
would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such
State bank ... may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute
which is hereby preempted for the purpose of this section ... charge
on any loan ... interest ... at the rate ... allowed by the laws of the
State, territory, or district where the bank is located ....28
25. See, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting); English v. General Elec.
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). But see
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 808 (1994)
("[N]either conflict preemption nor field preemption is justified from the perspective of ordinary statutory interpretation used to determine what Congress has actually done. In fact,
these two doctrines divert attention from actual intent.").
26. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480, 510 (2d ed. 1988).
27. The Court's usual reference to three different types of preemption analyses does not
mean that the categories are mutually exclusive. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 ("By referring to these three categories, we should not be taken to mean that they are rigidly distinct.").
As one commentator has stated, "[E]ven when Congress declares its preemptive intent in
express language, deciding exactly what it meant to preempt often resembles an exercise in
implied preemption analysis." TRIBE, supra note 26, at 481 n.14. For example, Justice
Stevens's appeal to legislative history and statutory structure to divine the meaning of an
express preemption provision in his dissenting opinion in Morales, see, 504 U.S. at 419-24,
essentially amounts to an implied preemption analysis. Also, in the last term, the Court
explicitly declared that express and implied preemption analyses are not mutually exclusive;
even if Congress includes an express preemption provision in a federal statute, courts may
engage in implied preemption analysis. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483
(1995). Furthermore, a clear distinction between implied and conflict preemption analyses
cannot be drawn. The Court, on a number of occasions, has observed that implied preemption can be understood as a species of conflict preemption. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 104;
English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n5.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 183ld(a) (1994) (emphasis added). The full text of§ 521 reads:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institutions, including savings banks, or insured branches of foreign banks with respect to inter-
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The question is whether the above express preemption prnvision
clearly manifests Congress's intention to preclude state prohibitions
of late fees on credit-card transactions.
Section II.A summarizes two different approaches that the
Supreme Court has used recently to analyze an express preemption
provision. This Part then uses the approach that presents a lower
barrier to finding preemption. Section II.B argues that the preemption of state usury laws prohibiting credit-card late fees cannot be
inferred from the ordinary meanings of the terms interest and interest rate, as they are used in section 521. Section II.C demonstrates
that the sparse legislative history of section 521 does not permit a
departure from the ordinary meaning of the language of section
521. Similarly, section II.D contends that the case law under NBA
section 85 fails to support such a departure.

A. Two Approaches To Analyzing an Express Preemption
Provision
The Supreme Court's recent preemption jurisprudence reveals
two competing approaches to analyzing express preemption provisions. The point of contention between the two approaches is the
applicability of the presumption against displacement of states' historic police powers.29
According to one approach, although the presumption against
displacement of ·states' traditional police powers is applicable in implied preemption cases, it is inappropriate once Congress has indicated unmistakably its intent to preempt state laws by an express
est rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such State
bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to charge in the absence of
this subsection, such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwith·
standing any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of
this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon
any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1

per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the
Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank or such insured
branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994) (emphasis added). As the emphasized portion shows,§ 521 confers on FDIC-insured state banks, not only the option of charging interest at the most fa·
vored lender rate, but also the option of charging one percent above the Federal Reserve
discount rate. Here, the drafters of § 521 were merely following the language of NBA § 85
which was revised in 1933 to include the one percent above the Federal Reserve discount·
rate option. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, ch. 89, § 25 48 Stat. 162, 191 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)). This latter option is irrelevant for purposes of this Note and therefore is ignored hereinafter.
29. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that states'
traditional police powers are not to be superseded unless that was the "clear and manifest
purpose" of Congress).
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provision.30 In express preemption cases, courts must apply the
"ordinary" principles of statutory construction to ascertain the
boundaries of the preemptive scope.31 Courts must defer to the
"ordinary" meaning of the statutory language even when a narrower construction of the statutory language can plausibly be
given.32
According to the second approach, the presumption against displacenent of states' traditional police powers applies in express
preemption analyses as well as in implied preemption analyses.33
This second approach demands the narrowest possible construction
of the statutory language34 or at least one narrower than what the
ordinary-principles approach requires.
Obviously, the ordinary-principles approach establishes a lower
threshold than the narrow-construction approach for finding an express preemption. If an analysis relying on the ordinary principles
of statutory construction fails to yield a finding of preemption, then
it follows that a narrower construction of the same statute will fail
as well. The initial question, then, is whether the above-cited language of DIDA section 521 displaces state laws prohibiting late fees
on credit-card transactions under the "ordinary" principles of statutory construction.3s
30. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-87; FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 56-60 (1990).
31. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 ("The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and
we accordingly 'begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.' " (quoting
FMC, 498 U.S. at 57) (emphasis added)); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 545 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
32. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Under the Supremacy Clause •.. our job is to interpret Congress's_decrees of
pre-emption neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their apparent meaning.").
The Court's analysis in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American Train Dispatchers'
Assn., 499 U.S. 117 (1991), provides a clear example of this first approach at work. In that
case, the Court interpreted an express preemption provision broadly (relatively speaking)
despite the fact that a canon of statutory construction made a narrower construction available. See 499 U.S. at 129.
33. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995); American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 828 (1995)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion); Morales, 504 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting); FMC, 498 U.S. at 67
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Cipollone, Justice Scalia complained
that the second approach relies on an "extraordinary and unprecedented principle of federal
statutory construction." 505 U.S. at 544.
34. This is Justice Scalia's characterization of the second approach. See Cipollone, 505
U.S. at545.
35. Although the rest of this Part relies on the ordinary-principles approach, there is
much to be said for the second, stricter approach given the concerns of federalism. Cf.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J.) ("Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to achieve the
supersession of State authority. • . • Any indulgence in construction should be in favor of the
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B. Ordinary Meanings of Interest and Interest Rate
Under the ordinary principles of statutory construction, the key
inquiry is whether state law provisions regulating credit-card late
fees are encompassed by the terms interest and interest rate, as those
terms are ordinarily understood. This section argues that late fees
are not within the ordinary meaning of interest or interest rate and
that therefore DIDA section 521 does not preempt state laws regulating late fees.
It is unlikely that Congress, in drafting section 521, departed
radically from the meanings of interest and interest rate that lexicographers employ.36 The 1981 edition of Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary defines interest as "a charge for borrowed money[,] generally a percentage of the amount borrowed."37 Perhaps more importantly, Black's Law Dictionary defines interest rate as "[t]he
percentage of an amount of money which is paid for its use for a
specified time."38 The definition of interest rate is more significant
here than that of interest because section 521 begins by stating explicitly that the purpose of the section is to "prevent discrimination
against [FDIC-insured state banks] . . . with respect to interest
rates. ''39 Moreover, section 521 mentions the word rate six times,
while using interest only twice; both times, the word interest is accompanied by rate. 40
One naturally infers from these definitions that, although
interest can mean a charge other than a numerical percentage of the
sum originally borrowed, the most "ordinary" meaning of the term
refers to a numerical percentage of the borrowed sum. Furthermore, it violates the ordinary meaning of the term to suggest that
interest rate signifies anything other than a numerical percentage
States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full
federal authority, completely displacing the States."); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947).
36. Justice Scalia appealed to Black's Law Dictionary to find the ordinary meaning of
"relating to" in Morales. See 504 U.S. at 383; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,
97 n.16 (1983). The First Circuit also initially resorted to dictionary definitions in its analysis
of DIDA § 521 in Greenwood. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 824
(1st Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
37. WEBSTER'S NEW CoLLEGIATE D1cnoNARY 597 (1981); see also THE COMPACT Ox.
FORD ENGUSH D1cnoNARY 864 (2d ed. 1991) (defining "interest" as "[m]oney paid for the
use of money lent ••• or for forbearance of a debt, according to a fixed ratio (rate per cent.)").
Black's Law Dictionary defines interest as "the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the
parties for the use or forbearance of borrowed money. . . . Payments a borrower pays a
lender for the use of the money. Cost of using credit or funds of another." BLACK'S LAw
D1cnoNARY 812 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Id. at 813.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994) (emphasis added). For the full text of § 521, see supra
note 28.
40. See supra note 28.
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rate of the sum originally borrowed.41 Therefore, late fees do not
constitute a part of interest or interest rate as those terms are ordinarily used.42
In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 43 the First Circuit
held that the meaning of the term interest is not limited to a numerical percentage of a borrowed sum.44 After citing the dictionary definitions to show that interest is not necessarily a numerical
percentage of the borrowed sum, the court went on to quote statements from two nineteenth-century Supreme Court opinions to the
same effect.45 "Thus," the First Circuit's argument continued, "the
door is open" to construing the term interest expansively.46
The First Circuit's approach, however, ignores the fact that the
"ordinary" meaning of the statutory language delineates the proper
scope of preemption. This reliance on the ordinary meaning cannot
be overcome by merely taking note of a handful of instances when
the Supreme Court, in using the word interest, meant something
more than a numerical percentage of a borrowed sum. The ordinary meaning of a word used by Congress "is not determined by
reference to variations on its ordinary meaning, but by the prdinary
meaning itself, i.e., the way it is generally used."47
The Greenwood court also opined that the meaning of interest
rate, as that term is used in DIDA section 521, is not limited to the
41. Cf. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 532 {1976) {"It twists the language beyond the breaking point to say that a law mandating that labeling contain certain information
is not a 'labeling requirement' [as that term is used in § 408 of the Federal Meat Inspection
Act].").
42. One court stated: "Similarly, in common parlance, 'interest rate' or 'rate of interest'
has a very narrow meaning. For example, when one is asked what interest rate he or she is
paying on a loan, the response is, 'eleven and one-half percent' or 'ten and three-eights percent.' If it is a real estate loan, the response may be, 'nine and one-half percent, and two
points.' Conversely, lay persons are not likely to associate 'interest rate' with late payment
fees, return check fees, etc., because those fees are usually contingent upon the borrower's
default, and are not part of the 'interest' paid to obtain the funds." Mazaika v. Bank One,
Columbus, N.A., 653 A.2d 640, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
43. 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 {1993).
44. See 971 F.2d at 824-26.
45. See 971 F.2d at 824-25 (quoting Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 321 (1893),
and Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1873)). The Shoemaker Court stated: "Interest accrues either by agreement of the debtor to allow it for the use of money, or, in the
nature of damages, by reason of the failure of the debtor to pay the principal when due." 147
U.S. at 321. The Brown Court defined interest as "the compensation allowed by law, or fixed
by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money, or as damages for its detention." 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) at 185. Black's Law Dictionary apparently followed the first part of the Brown
Court's statement - but not the last part containing the words "or as damages for its detention" - in defining interest. See supra note 37.
46. Greenwood, 971 F.2d at 825.
47. Copeland v. MBNA Arn., N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Colo. 1993) (criticizing the
Greenwood court's reasoning).
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numerical percentage rate of a sum borrowed.4 8 In effect, the First
Circuit read the word rate out of section 521. In Fort Halli/ax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 49 an express preemption case, the Supreme
Cqurt disapproved of reading a term out of a statute.so Here, as in
Fort Halli/ax Packing, the statutory language presents a formidable
obstacle to an expansive reading of section 521.Sl
C. Legislative History of DIDA Section 521
In principle, the assumption that the ordinary meaning of an express preemption provision delineates the proper scope of preemption can be overcome.52 An examination of a statute's legislative
history may furnish reasons to set aside the presumption. Nothing,
however, can be found in the legislative history of DIDA section
521 to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of that provision's preemptive language.
In order to displace the initial assumption, the DIDA's legislative history must clearly evince a legislative intent contrary to the
ordinary meaning of section 521. Section 521, however, was an
emergency measure enacted with very little congressional debate.s3
48. See Greenwood, 971 F2d at 825-26. The First Circuit cited a variety of cases to buttress its claim that "[t]erms in an act whose meaning may appear plain outside the scheme of
the statute can take on a different meaning when read in their proper context." 971 F.2d at
825 (citations omitted). Yet, the court failed to cite any instances when the term interest rate
was interpreted to mean anything other than a numerical percentage rate of a borrowed sum.
49. 482 U.S. 1 {1987).
50. In Fort Hallifax Packing, employers who had not provided severance payments to
employees as required by a Maine law argued that any state laws pertaining to "employee
benefits" were preempted by the preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) {1994). The Court rejected this argument
by pointing out that the preemption provision of ERISA specifically states that any state laws
relating to "employment benefit plans" are preempted. See Fort Hal/ifax Packing, 482 U.S. at
7-8.
51. Justice Frankfurter once remarked that the foremost duty of courts in interpreting a
statute is not to do violence to the statutory language. See Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 543.
52. The Supreme Court's recent decision in American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817
{1995), provides an example. In that case, the Court held that whereas the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempts any consumer claims against airlines based on statutory consumerprotection laws, the federal law does not preempt any claims based on breach of contracts.
See 115 S. Ct. at 824 & n.5 (1995). The Court thus drew a distinction between claims based
on laws enacted by states and common law claims despite the fact that the relevant express
preemption provision simply provided that "a state ••. may not enact or enforce a law ..•
related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 41713{b)(1) {1994), quoted
in American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 821 n.1. This departure from the statutory language, however, drew spirited criticisms from Justices Stevens and O'Connor. See 115 S. Ct. at 827-28
(Stevens, J., dissenting); 115 S. Ct. at 828-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961).
53. The original bills that developed into House Bill 4986, the omnibus bill that became
the DIDA, did not contain anything corresponding to§§ 521-523. See H.R. 4986, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. {1979). It was only in 1979, when the Senate was considering House Bill 4986, that
two Senators introduced a bill, Senate Bill 1988, and a representative introduced a companion bill, House Bill 6503, in the House. See S. 1988, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. {1979); H.R. 6503,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). These two bills, the contents of which closely resemble those of
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For this reason, only a very meager legislative history for section
521 remains, and what little remains does not support any depar-

ture from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The
Greenwood court itself ultimately conceded that the DIDA's legislative history yielded no definitive answer as to the preemptive
scope of section 521.S4

D.

Case Law Under NBA Section 85 and the Distinction
Between Interest and Penalties
Available case law. is ail equally insecure support for an expansive reading of DIDA section 521. In principle, an examination of a
statute's case law may defeat the assumption that the ordinary
meaning delineates the scope of preemption.ss DIDA section 521
lacks any such case law, but the case law under NBA section 85 may
appear to offer some hope to those who ignore the ordinary meaning of DIDA section 521. As observed in the Introduction, the language of DIDA section 521 closely mirrors that of NBA section 85.
When a statute adopts words from an older statute, the judicial interpretation of those words in the older statute is also transplanted
to the new statute.56 It is then necessary to ask whether credit-card
late fees should be considered interest or interest rate under the case
law of NBA section 85. If so, the same fees ought to be considered
interest or interest rate under DIDA section 521 as well.
In a series of cases, most de~ided prior to the enactment of the
DIDA, courts ruled that various flat fees that national banks charge
are interest and hence governed by section 85 of the NBA. So far,
credit-card cash-advance fees,s 7 charges incurred by way of compensating balance requirements,58 closing fees,59 bonuses and com§§ 521-523 of the DIDA, were simply absorbed into House Bill 4986 without ever being
reported out of committees. See Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 4 n.10. See generally
Melissa A. Byers et. al., Student Project: The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 14 AKRON L. REv. 423 (1981).
54. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 828 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
55. The history of NBA § 85 itself offers an example. The most favored lender doctrine
could not be inferred from the ordinary meaning of the language of § 85. It was the Supreme
Court, in Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873), that ushered in
this doctrine. See generally supra note 4. Yet, the most favored lender doctrine has been so
firmly established by Tiffany and its progeny that no recent court interpreting § 85 has questioned it. See Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 8 ("Despite its convoluted language, section
85 continues to be interpreted by the courts as it was in Tiffany - that national banks are on
a par with the most favored lender in the state.").
56. See Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944); see also Frankfurter,
supra note 35, at 537.
57. See Fisher v. First Natl. Bank, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977).
58. See American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 690 F.2d 781, 787-88 (9th
Cir. 1982); McAdoo v. Union Natl. Bank, 535 F.2d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 1976).
59. See Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.
1972).
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missions,60 mortgage taxes and recording fees,61 brokerage
charges,62 and charges for insurance on loan collateral63 have been
judged to be interest under NBA section 85.64 The case law under
NBA section 85 then arguably justifies an expansive reading of the
word interest as used in DIDA section 521. The Greenwood court
ultimately relied on this case law in reaching its conclusion that
DIDA section 521 preempted the Massachusetts law prohibiting
credit-card late fees.6s
It is incorrect to infer from these decisions that credit-card late
fees also should be considered interest under NBA section 85 and
therefore also under DIDA section 521. A crucial conceptual distinction exists between credit-card late fees and the fiat fees at issue
in the above-mentioned decisions. Whereas payments of fiat fees at
issue in those decisions are preconditions for credit extensions, payments of late fees are not.66 Late fees are penalties, and they are
charged only on contingent events of borrower default. Although
agreeing to terms governing late-fee payments is a prerequisite for
loan extensions, actual payment of such contingent default charges
is not.
This is not merely an armchair distinction. In Lorillard v.
Pons, 67 the Supreme Court stated that "where words are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country[,] they are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."68 Both prior to and after the passage of the NBA, in other
contexts, the Supreme Court has distinguished interest, as that term
is normally understood, from fees charged as penalties. Notably, in
Spain v. Hamilton's Administrator, 69 a case decided one year before
60. See Cronkleton v. Hall, 66 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1933); Baker v. Lynchburg Natl.
Bank, 91S.E.157 (Va. 1917).
61. See Panos v. Smith, 116 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940); Schumacher v. Lawrence, 108 F.2d
576 (6th Cir. 1940).
62. See In re Gerber's Estate, 9 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. 1939).
63. See Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., No. C2-90-709, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16645 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 1992).
64. A district court in North Carolina also entered a declaratory judgment to the effect
that annual membership fees for credit-card holders constitute interest under NBA § 85. The
Fourth Circuit, however, held that the case did not arise under that federal statute and hence
denied jurisdiction. See City Natl. Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1982).
65. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 829-30 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
66. Some courts denying that NBA § 85 and DIDA § 521 preempted state laws regulating
credit-card late fees have relied on this distinction. See Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 900 P.2d
690, 717-18 (Cal. 1994) (George, J. dissenting); Gadon v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 653 A.2d
697, 699 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); see also Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 22-23, 30.
67. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
68. 434 U.S. at 583 (quoting Standard Oil v. United States, 224 U.S. 1, 59 (1911)).
69. 68 U.S. 604 (1863).
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the passage of the NBA, the Court stated: "The payment of anything additional depends also upon a contingency, and not upon
any happenings of a certain event, which of itself would be deemed
insufficient to make a loan usurious."7° Most recently, in 1993, the
Court once again recognized the distinction between interest and
penalties charged only on contingent occasions of default. In construing section 3717 of the Debt Collection Act of 1982,71 the Court
stated:
Our conclusion [is] that the States remain subject to common law
prejudgment interest liability . . . . [I]nstead of imposing a preestablished rate of interest, the district courts retain discretion to
choose the appropriate rate in a given case. Unlike the common law,
§ 3717 also imposes processing fees [for late payments] and penalty
charges.72
The connection between the numerical percentage of the borrowed
sum, which forms the core of interest, and late fees is far more tenuous than the connection between the numerical percentage and
other fiat fees. The above judicial statements indicate that some
lower courts' treatment of various preconditional flat fees as interest
provides a poor basis from which to infer that late fees also must be
considered interest.
III.

IMPLIED PREEMPTION

Although DIDA section 521 does not explicitly preempt state
laws regulating credit-card late fees, both NBA section 8573 and
70. 68 U.S. at 626; see also Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 205, 226 (1830) ("If a party
agree[s] to pay a specific sum exceeding the lawful interest, provided he do[es] not pay the
principal by a day certain, it is not usury. By a punctual payment of the principal he may
avoid the payment of the sum stated, which is considered as a penalty.").
71. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3701-33 (1994).
72. United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1635-36 (1993) (citation omitted). Congress
also has distinguished interest from penalties. Both the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1605 (1994), and its implementing regulation, commonly known as "Regulation Z," 12
C.F.R. § 226.4 (1995), define finance charge as including interest, service charges, and other
fees but not including late fees or other such penalties. Neither the Truth in Lending Act nor
Regulation Z is authoritative in construing NBA § 85 or DIDA § 521. Yet, the two laws
further confirm one's initial intuition that interest is conceptually distinct from penalties and
hence does not include late fees.
73. NBA § 85, as amended and codified, reads:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made,
or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a
rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in
effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any
State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited
shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under title 62 of
the Revised Statutes.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). Section 85, as modified by the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66,
ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 162, 191 (1933), gives national banks, not only the option of charging
interest at the most favored lender rate, but also the option of charging interest at one per-
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DIDA section 521 may impliedly preempt such state laws. When
Congress's command is not unmistakably clear, a federal occupation of an entire subject area can be found only when the nature of
the federal regulatory scheme permits no other conclusion.74 Furthermore, when Congress legislates in a field that the states traditionally have occupied, courts must start with "the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress. " 75
Congress has not preempted the entire field of bank regulation.76 The so-called dual banking system, in which both the federal
and state governments exercise regulatory authority over both national and state banks, came into full being with the enactment of
the NBA and has persisted to the present time.77 Even national
banks "are governed in their daily course of business far more by
the laws of the State than of the nation."78 In general, states regulate national banks unless the pervasive nature of the federal regulatory scheme leaves no room for state regulations, or the
effectiveness of national banks is impaired by the state regulation.79
cent above the Federal Reserve discount rate. As said above, see supra note 28, in connection with DIDA § 521, the latter option is irrelevant for purposes of this Note.
74. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Commn.,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963).
75. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946) (citing Allen-Bradley Local
No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942); and Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959) ("[A state's power is intact] where the regulated
conduct touche[s] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the
absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act.") (Frankfurter, J.). This presumption against displacement of
states' traditional police powers applies in implied preemption analyses, no matter what its
applicability in the express preemption context. See supra section II.A.
76. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 171-72 (1985); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980) ("We readily
accept the submission that, both as a matter of history and as a matter of present commercial
reality, banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern."); National
State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985-86 (3d Cir. 1980); Perdue v. Crocker Natl. Bank, 702
P2d 503, 520 (Cal. 1985).
77. See generally Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition
in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1977); Kenneth E. Scott, Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Banking Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1980).
78. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1896); National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869) ("All their contracts are governed and construed by State
laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their
liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the [federal] govemment that it becomes
unconstitutional."); see also Robert A. Burgess & Monica A. Ciolfi, Exportation or Exploitation? A State Regulator's View of Interstate Credit Card Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 929, 93839 (1987).
79. See Anderson Natl. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944) {"This Court has often
pointed out that national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the na-
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In enacting NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521, Congress
sought to increase its regulatory domain within the dual banking
system, but it clearly did not intend to regulate all aspects of bank
regulation. Therefore, the question arises as to what aspects of
state bank-regulation laws, besides those regulating interest rates,
NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempted. Because NBA
section 85 and DIDA section 521 deal specifically with interest
rates, it is possible that the two federal statutes evince congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of consumer-credit protection.
This Part argues that neither NBA section 85 nor DIDA section
521 indicates a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt
the entire field of consumer-credit protection. Section III.A points
out that state laws regulating late fees fall within the field of
consumer-credit protection, which is a field traditionally governed
by the states. Therefore, the Supreme Court's usual presumption
against displacement of states' traditional police powers applies to
any implied preemption analysis relating to state laws regulating
credit-card late fees. Section IIl.B shows that no "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" exists to surmount this presumption.

A. Presumption Against Displacement of States' Traditional
Police Powers
Do state laws regulating credit-card late fees constitute exercises
of states' traditional police powers?BO In the past, the Supreme
Court has refused to supplant state laws - even when those laws
significantly affected the workings of federal laws - if the states
were exercising their traditional police powers.s1
tional banking laws or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks' functions."); National Bank, 16 U.S. at 362 ("[T]he agencies of the Federal government are only
exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair their
efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve that government.
Any other rule would [constitute] ... an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights
of the States.").
80. Over the years, the Court has given very broad readings to the term "traditional police powers of the states." The following statement in 1882 is not atypical: "[T]he States have
full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, including in that general
designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their
people." Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683 (1882); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ("The traditional police power of the States is defined as the
authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals .... "); Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The traditional police
power of the States has been deemed to embrace any measure thought to further the wellbeing of the State in question, subject only to the specific prohibitions contained ~ the Federal Constitution."). Justice Frankfurter, writing in 1947, used police power as an example of
the most vague of legal terms. See Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 534.
81. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1983) ("[A]s we view the issue, Congress ... intended that
the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, but that the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need,
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State laws that regulate credit-card late fees are laws governing
bank oper.ations. But they also can be classified as consumerprotection provisions.82 As such, these state laws constitute exercises of state police powers aimed at the promotion of the "peace,
comfort, convenience, and prosperity"83 of citizens.
Consumer protection is an area traditionally occupied by the
states. 84 Admittedly, it is not possible to draw a clear line between
usury laws and consumer-protection laws. Usury laws or consumercredit-protection laws are the oldest and longest-surviving species of
consumer-protection laws.85 Yet, except in the area of interest-rate
regulation, consumer-credit protection has been the concern of and
is increasingly becoming the exclusive concern of the states as state
legislatures fill the vacuum left by the federal government's gradual
withdrawal from the field since 1980.86
In sum, states' regulation of credit-card late fees constitutes an
exercise of their traditional police powers. It follows that the presumption against displacement of such laws applies.87
B. "Clear and Manifest Purpose of Congress"
The fact that the presumption against displacement of states'
traditional police powers applies does not automatically rule out a
reliability, cost, and other related state concerns."); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) ("In the exercise of [their traditional police] power[s], the
states ... may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently
with the federal government.").
82. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. §§ 5-3-203(5)(a), 5-5-202 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (Uniform
Consumer Credit Code); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 6-1-105 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (Colorado Consumer Credit Code); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2, 56:8-19 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995) (New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, 201-9.2 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law); S.C. ConE ANN. § 37-3-202
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995) (South Carolina Consumer Protection Code).
83. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 683.
84. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989); General Motors Corp. v.
Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Because consumer protection is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this
area."). Even the First Circuit, in Greenwood, admitted that consumer protection falls within
the domain of states' traditional police powers. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,
971 F.2d 818, 828 (1st Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
85. See JoHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CoNSUMER LAw 630-33 (2d ed. 1991).
86. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1430-31 (1984) (pointing out that the states have become
more protective in reaction to the federal government's withdrawal from the field in the
1980's). As two commentators stated, "Federal involvement in modem day consumer credit
regulation has been precise, limited, and very deferential to state interests even when there
has been express preemption." Burgess & Ciolfi, supra note 78, at 937.
87. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) ("In
determining whether state regulation has been preempted by federal action, 'the intent to
supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the
Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field." (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501, 533 (1911))).
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finding of implied preemption. A "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" can surmount a state's exercise of its traditional police
powers.8 8 The Supreme Court's past decisions, however, demonstrate that this is an extremely high standard to meet, and it is not
met by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521.
In the cases in which the Supreme Court sustained a finding of
implied preemption in a field traditionally occupied by the states,
the pervasive nature of the federal regulation left no room for parallel or supplementary state regulations.s9 As argued in the previous section, Congress has not made plain its intent to occupy the
entire field of consumer-credit protection by a pervasive scheme of
regulation.9o Far from it, states' traditional powers in this area remain largely intact. The enactment in 1994 of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act91 is the latest indication that
Congress will defer to the states in the field of consumer-credit protection. Section 102(b)(l)(B) of that legislation states:
The laws of the host State regarding ... consumer protection ... shall
apply to any branch in the host State of an out-of-State national bank
to the same extent as such State laws apply to a branch of a bank
chartered by that State ....92

It follows that state laws regulating credit-card late fees are preempted only if they actually conflict with the objectives of the NBA
and the DIDA.

IV.

CONFLICT PREEMPTION

Even when a federal statute does not occupy an entire field of
regulation, it displaces a state law if that law stands as an obstacle to
the full execution of the objectives of the federal law.93 It then
must be asked whether a state law provision prohibiting or otherwise regulating late fees on credit-card transactions actually "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" 94 of the objectives of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521.
88. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
89. See 331 U.S. at 230 ("The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.").
90. See supra section III.A.
91. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
92. Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102(b)(l)(B), 108 Stat. 2338, 2350 (1994) (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1994)) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 240, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.16-17, 21 (1994)
("Passage of this legislation will not limit the states' authority to conduct effective banking
supervision or administer local laws, including tax and consumer protection laws."). See generally Carey C. Chem, Interstate Banking Issues After the Riegle-Neal Act of1994, 65 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 415 (Sept. 11, 1995) ("Federalism is ... a key component of Riegle-Neal.").
93. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
94. 312 U.S. at 67.
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Congress's purpose in enacting NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 was to establish a competitive, level playing field among
national banks, FDIC-insured state banks, and the most favored
state lenders. The initial purpose of section 85 was to protect national banks from probable discrimination by the state legislatures.95 Congress sought to accomplish this goal by instituting
parity between national and state lenders with respect to the charging of interest. Yet, the Supreme Court's subsequent construction
of the NBA has established that section 85 does not exactly demand
lender parity between national banks and state banks but rather
lender parity between national banks and the "most favored lenders" of each state. 96 This is the most favored lender doctrine. Congress, however, did not confer upon national banks a position
superior to that of the most favored state lenders.97
Likewise, it is clear from the language and history of DIDA section 521 that Congress's purpose in enacting this section was to
achieve parity between national and FDIC-insured state banks.
Section 521 begins with the words "In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered [banks] . . . with respect to interest
rates." 98 Two bills, the contents of which eventually were absorbed
into the DIDA to become sections 521 through 523, have the subtitle "To equalize competition between State and national banks. "99
Records of congressional debates on the DIDA also refer to the
aim of achieving parity between national and FDIC-insured state
banks.100 As in the case of NBA section 85 and national banks,
however, there is no evidence that, by enacting DIDA section 521,
95. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
96. See Daggs v. Phoenix Natl. Bank, 177 U.S. 549, 555 (1900); Union Natl. Bank v.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 163 U.S. 325, 331 (1896). See generally William M.
Burke & Alan S. Kaplinsky, Unraveling the New Federal Usury Law, 37 Bus. LAW. 1079,
1094-96 (1982).
97. See Union National Bank, 163 U.S. at 331 ("[W]hile the right of the national bank
springs from the act of Congress, yet it is only a right to have an equal administration of the
rule established by state law."); see also EDWARD L. SYMONS & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING
LAw 250 (3d ed. 1991) ("The primary purpose of the section is to preserve competitive equality between national banks and other lenders."); Burke & Kaplinsky, supra note 96, at 1102
("Congress intended to place national banks on an equal footing with competing institutions
and individuals in their states of location . . . . However, there is no indication that Congress
intended that the economic benefit to the national banks on such loans be greater than that
available to others.").
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994).
99. S. 1988, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); H.R. 6503, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
100. See 126 CoNG. REc. 6900 (1980) ("Title V [of the DIDA] also contains a provision
which provides parity, or competitive equality, between national banks and State chartered
depository institutions on lending limits." (remarks of Sen. Bumpers)); id. at 6894 ("(T]he
legislation removes many competitive inequities between different types of financial institutions. It seeks to create a level playing field so that all institutions may compete on the same
terms." (remarks of Sen. Bumpers)); 125 CoNG. REc. 30,655 (1979) ("The bill my colleague
(Mr. Bumpers) and I shall introduce would merely allow State chartered, federally insured
banks ... to charge the same interest rate as national banks." (remarks of Sen. Pryor)).
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Congress meant to confer upon FDIC-insured state banks any privileges over and above those enjoyed by the most favored state
lenders.
This Part argues that state laws regulating late fees on creditcard transactions do not conflict with the objective of either NBA
section 85 or DIDA section 521. Section IV.A observes that the
objective of lender parity demands a scope of preemption greater
than that of state laws governing interest rates alone. Section IV.B
demonstrates that placing all state law provisions having some implications for creditors' aggregate yields and borrowers' aggregate
costs - including those having the most tenuous link to interest
rates - within the preemptive scope yields a result that neither
banks nor consumers can accept. Therefore, what is needed is a
scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates alone yet
smaller than that of all state laws affecting creditors' yields and borrowers' costs. Section IV.C recommends drawing the line between
state law provisions governing requirements preconditional to
credit extensions and state law provisions regulating contingent occasions of default. The former type of provisions should be considered preempted by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521. Section
IV.C thus argues that the fact that state laws regulating credit-card
late fees come into effect only on contingent occasions of default
should be a sufficient condition for such laws to escape preemption.
Finally, section IV.D responds to two possible objections to the solution proposed in section IV.C.
A.

The Need for a Scope of Preemption Greater Than That of
Interest Rates Alone

NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 demand a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates alone given that some
state laws regulating nonrate aspects of credit transactions stand in
the way of achieving lender parity. This conclusion follows from
how the ~o statutes operate in the intrastate loan-transaction
setting.,,·
An example illustrates this point. Assume that the State of
Hutchins allows small loan companies chartered by that state to
charge interest at twelve percent for a particular class of loans and
allows banks to charge only nine percent for the same class of loans.
NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempt the Hutchins law
imposing the nine-percent ceiling for banks by permitting a national
or FDIC-insured state bank located in Hutchins to "borrow" the
twelve-percent rate for transactions involving the same class of
loans. Often, however, the privilege of charging the higher rate of
interest is accompanied by strict state law provisions ranging from
those governing methods of rate computation to those aimed at
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consumer protection.101 · NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521,
therefore, mandate a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates. If national or FDIC-insured state banks located in
Hutchins were allowed to lend at the most favored lender rate but
were excused from such other provisions accompanying that rate,
then the result would not be lender parity but a special advantage
for those banks over the most favored state lenders. It follows that
at least some state provisions accompanying the most favored
lender rate must apply to credit transactions of national and FDICinsured state banks, and such provisions must be considered within
the preemptive scope of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521.
The need for a preemptive scope greater than that of interest
rates was recognized also by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) 102 in a 1936 interpretive ruling, which has been
codified as a federal regulation.103 That ruling stated that "[i]f State
law permits a higher interest rate on a specified class of loans, a
national bank making such loans at such higher rate is subject ... to
the provisions of State law relating to such class of loans that are
material to the determination of the interest rate. " 104
The OCC's words themselves do not provide any independent
guidance in determining which nonrate state provisions are preempted by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521. But the OCC's
words furnish convenient labels that are used in the following
paragraphs. Hereinafter, the word material is used as a convenient
label to designate all state law provisions that need to be preempted
along with the interest-rate provisions to achieve the objective of
lender parity. Its opposite, immaterial, is used to designate all state
law provisions that need not be preempted to achieve lender parity
and those provisions whose preemption threaten lender parity by
providing national and FDIC-insured state banks with privileges
over and above those enjoyed by the most favored state lenders. To
make a tautological statement then, to achieve full lender parity as
NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 demand, a national or
FDIC-insured bank charging the most favored lender rate must
abide by material state law provisions that accompany that rate.
101. See, e.g., Mo. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAw §§ 12-301 to 12-317 (1990 & Supp. 1994)
(Maryland Consumer Loan Law); MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 493.1-493.26 (1979) (Michigan
Small Loan Act).
102. See supra note 10.
103. This interpretive ruling deserves more deference than the OCC's interpretive letters,
some of which are criticized infra in section IV.D. First, as said in the text above, this interpretive ruling has been codified as a federal regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1995). In
addition, the Supreme Court, in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 314 n.26 (1978), implicitly affirmed the content of this interpretive ruling. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
104. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
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The determination of whether NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempt states' credit-card late-fee provisions depends on
where the line between material and immaterial state law provisions
is drawn. It is far from clear exactly what type of state law provisions should be considered material to the determination of the interest rate. 105 The OCC itself has done much groping but has not
ventured to articulate a standard.106
B.

The All-or-Nothing Approach: An Impractical Option

One possible position to take is to refuse to ·draw the line at all
and to consider all state law provisions having some implications for
creditors' aggregate yields and borrowers' aggregate costs in credit
transactions - including those having only the most tenuous connection to interest rates - materiaz. 101 Although this standard ultimately proves to be impractical, it is difficult to deny its initial
intuitive appeal. True lender parity seems to demand completely
equal treatment under state law. State law provisions regulating
105. As can be seen, the OCC interpretive ruling states that only those provisions "material to the determination of the interest rate," see 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1995) (emphasis
added), are binding on the banks charging the most favored lender rate. A late-fee provision, as pointed out in section 11.B of this Note, is not in any way detenninative of the interest rate. Yet, this fact cannot be used to dispose hastily of the materiality issue. Even if a
late-fee provision is not material to the determination of the interest rate, if it conflicts with
the objective of either NBA § 85 or DIDA § 521, it must give way. Therefore, the abovequoted language must be treated as being equivalent to "material to the pursuit of lender
parity."
106. In an interpretive letter, the OCC stated that a state law provision enumerating a
number of notification requirements that lenders must comply with prior to the commencement of a retail-charge agreement is not material to the determination of the interest rate.
OCC Staff Interpretation Letter No. I78, 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) q[ 97,239 (Jan. 12,
1981). In the same letter, the OCC also stated that, if state law authorizes an interest rate for
a loan of up to a certain amount, then the cap is material, and hence a bank borrowing the
interest rate may not ignore the cap. See id. ("I can think of nothing more 'material' to the
determination of an interest rate than the amount of the loan."); see also Kathleen E. Keest
et al., Recent Developments Regarding Interest Rate Regulation, 48 Bus. LAW. 1085, 1088-90
(1993) (summarizing an unpublished OCC interpretive letter which opined that state law
provisions setting forth the size and maturity of loans and the classes of borrowers to whom a
given category of loans may be made are material, while opining that certain Texas creditunion regulations aimed at protecting the safety and soundness of credit unions are immaterial). But the OCC did not articulate a standard that others can appeal to in making reasoned distinctions between material and immaterial state law provisions.
On at least one occasion, the OCC confessed its inability to provide a general standard
for detennining which state law provisions are material See Gregory J. Pulles, Exporting
Non-Interest-Rate Provisions, 39 Bus. LAW. 1251, 1271-73 (1984) (summarizing an unpublished OCC interpretive letter that acknowledged the OCC's inability to provide the "general
answer" to the materiality question and displaying a "mild surprise" at the OCC's timidity in
articulating a standard).
107. A Maryland trial court, in Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs; took just such a position. See
Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, 60063/120-1/Fol.713 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City, Md. Sept. 16,
1981) (holding that national and FDIC-insured state banks borrowing the higher rates allowed by the Maryland Consumer Loan Law also must abide by all substantive provisions of
that law), affd. in part, revd. in part sub nom. Attorney Gen. v. Equitable Co., 450 A.2d 1273
(Md. 1982), cited in Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, 11 at n.35.
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credit-card late fees are clearly material and hence preempted, according to this very inclusive standard.
As two commentators have pointed out, 108 however, this "all-ornothing" approach gives rise to some grave problems. The approach, in many instances, would result in "artificial substitutions"
of a set of provisions designed for one type of loan transaction for
another set suitable for a quite different type of transaction.109 For
example,110 assume that the State of Hutchins allows banks to
charge interest at fifteen percent for open-end credit-card transactions and allows some nonbank state-licensed lenders to charge
twenty percent for closed-end consumer loans with stated maturity
dates. The fifteen-percent open-end credit-card rate may be accompanied by a provision allowing banks to charge annual fees and
another requiring banks to give consumers thirty-day grace periods
before interest on their purchases starts to accrue. The twentypercent consumer rate, on the other hand, may be accompanied by
a provision prohibiting the charging of annual fees and no provision
requiring grace periods. Under NBA section 85 and DIDA section
521, a national or FDIC-insured state bank located in Hutchins, for
its open-end credit-card transactions, may borrow the higher
closed-end consumer-loan rate. But for the privilege of charging a
higher rate, the bank may be barred from charging annual fees. At
the same time, consumers, when using credit cards issued by that
bank, would be deprived of the usual grace period before interest
begins to accrue. The banks borrowing the most favored lender
rate, as well as consumers, must consider this result highly
undesirable.111
Even more undesirable and absurd results would obtain if nonfinancial provisions of state laws were considered material. For example, the State of Hutchins may allow its small loan companies to
charge a higher rate of interest for a particular type of loan than the
rate that its banks are allowed to charge. Hutchins, however, may
require the small loan companies also to comply with some strict
nonfinancial provisions - such as those dealing with licensing, examination, and disclosure requirements. Whether creditors are required to comply with such nonfinancial requirements often has
significant implications for creditors' aggregate yields and borrow108. See Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 25-30.
109. See id. at 30.
110. This is a modified version of an example given by Arnold and Rohner, see id. at 2728, 30.
111. In Equitable, the plaintiff banks argued that compliance with some of the provisions
of the Maryland Consumer Loan Law would be "impracticable, undesirable, and in effect,
prevent their credit card operations" and would "unlawfully vitiate their most favored lender
status." Equitable, A-60063/120-1/Fol. 713, at 32, cited in Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at
27 n.105.
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ers' aggregate costs in loan transactions. Under the most favored
lender doctrine, a national or FDIC-insured state bank located in
Hutchins may borrow the higher small-loan-company rate on
credit-card transactions. It, however, would be irrational to require
these banks also to comply with the licensing, examination, and disclosure requirements that are designed specially for small-loancompany transactions.112
Furthermore, state law provisions that ultimately affect creditors' total yields may range far beyond those contained in the state
usury or loan laws.113 Even a state's capitalization requirements
and tax laws often has significant implications for creditors' aggregate yields. 114 It would be absurd to think, however, as the logic of
the all-or-nothing approach demands, that NBA section 85 and
DIDA section 521 preempted state capitalization requirements and
tax laws having significant implications for creditors' ultimate
yields.115
C. Interest-Penalty Distinction Redux
Therefore, what is needed is a scope of preemption greater than
that of interest rates yet smaller than that of all state laws affecting
creditors' yields and borrowers' costs. Once again, the distinction
between interest and penalty can be appealed to. The line between
material and immaterial state law provisions should be drawn between state laws governing requirements preconditional to credit
extensions, on the one hand, and state laws regulating contingent
occasions of default, on the other. The Supreme Court's conflict
preemption jurisprudence justifies this distinction.
The Supreme Court, in conflict preemption cases, repeatedly
has pointed out that a mere possibility of conflict between federal
and state laws is insufficient to warrant a finding of preemption;
112. See Howard J. Finkelstein, Most Favored Lender Status for Insured Banks, 42 Bus.
915, 918-19 (1987). A Minnesota appeals court decided in 1986 that certain disclosure
requirements were immaterial but did not offer a rationale for this decision. See First Bank
E. v. Bobeldyk, 391 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
113. See Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 27.
114. See id.
115. In his dissenting opinion in Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., Justice George pointed out
that, although state law provisions governing building permits, minimum wages, and healthand-safety requirements, in principle, could be used to discriminate against out-of-state
banks, it would be absurd to treat them as regulating interest within the meaning of NBA
§ 85. See Smiley v. Citibank, 900 P.2d 690, 719 (Cal. 1995) (George, J. dissenting).
During the 1980's, loan products proliferated, see Ralph P. DeSanto, Note, Product Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision of Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1127, 1127-29 (1985), and the states reacted by
enacting detailed consumer-protection laws to safeguard their citizens, see Burgess & Ciolli,
supra note 78, at 935. The resulting complexity adds to the potential for absurd substitutions
of one set of state law provisions for another.
LAW.
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only an obvious or imminent conflict will do. 116 In Huron Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 117 the Court warned against "seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists."118 Furthermore, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Ware, 119 the Court opined that the proper approach in conflict
preemption cases is an analysis that reconciles "the operation of
both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one
completely ousted."120
When an artificial substitution of one set of state law provisions
for another occurs, even in purely intrastate transactions, consumers are deprived of the consumer protection their state legislature
devised for them. The same occurs in interstate transactions, when
a national or FDIC-insured state bank exports the most favored
lender rate to customers residing in other states. Because the bank
thereby also would be exporting the material provisions of its homestate law: along with the rate, the corresponding state law provisions
of the importing state would be preempted.121 Such an occurrence
denies consumers of the importing state the protection their elected
legislators devised for them.
An attempt to reconcile the operations of NBA section 85 and
DIDA section 521 and those of state consumer-credit-protection
laws must be made. One means of reconciliation is to reinvoke the
distinction between state laws regulating interest rates and fees,
payment of which is a precondition for loan extensions, on the one
hand, and those laws coming into play only on contingent occasions
116. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130 (1978); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973)); Florida Lime & Avo·
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[F]or an Act of Congress
completely to displace a State law, 'the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive,
so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.'" (citation
omitted)).
117. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
118. 362 U.S. at 446.
119. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
120. 414 U.S. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1962));
see 414 U.S. at 127 n.8 ("fThe Silver] approach is supported by decisions extending back to
the tum of the century.'' (citations omitted)); see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 183 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing the Silver decision with approval).
121. According to Burgess and Ciolfi, see supra note 78, at 936-41, this result is untenable. The authors of that article try to drive a wedge between the most favored lender doctrine and the exportation doctrine by pointing out that Marquette did not involve a borrowing
and exporting of the most favored lender rate. The authors' efforts seem ineffective in the
end, however. It is true that in Marquette a bank located in Nebraska simply exported the
rate that banks in Nebraska were authorized by Nebraska law to charge to residents in Minnesota. Yet, as pointed out in the Introduction, the Marquette Court implicitly approved of
the most favored lender doctrine, and the net result of the decision seems to be that a national bank and now an FDIC-insured state bank may export the most favored lender rate
authorized by the laws of the state in which the bank is located.
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of default, on the other.122 Classifying only those state laws that
address various preconditions for an extension of credit as preempted by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 provides a reasonable accommodation of the federal interest in equalizing
competition among different types of lenders and states' interests in
protecting credit consumers.
According to this approach, rate-related state law provisions,
such as those governing the frequency of compounding, and those
dealing with required fees, such as annual fees and cash-advance
fees, would be considered material to the determination of the interest rate. On the other hand, state Jaw provisions dealing with,
for example, creditor remedies and grace periods for debtors would
be considered immaterial. Consequently, state law provisions dealing with late fees on credit-card transactions would be considered
immaterial and hence escape the preemptive reach of the NBA and
the DIDA.123
Admittedly, drawing the line between material and immaterial
provisions to coincide with the line between preconditional and
contingent charges does not result in complete parity between national and FDIC-insured state banks, on the one hand, and the
most favored state lenders, on the other. If state laws allowed the
most favored state lenders to charge certain contingent fees while
prohibiting all banks from charging the same fees, then the national
and FDIC-insured state banks would suffer from a competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, if state laws allowed only banks to
charge certain contingent fees, then national and FDIC-insured
banks would have an advantage over the most favored state lenders. The ideal of complete lender parity would not be achieved in
either instance.
122. Section II.D appealed to this distinction to show that the case law under NBA § 85
does not demand treating credit-card late fees as interest under DIDA § 521.
123. A clarification must be made. Wbile only those state laws that deal with preconditions for extension of credit should be considered material, not all such provisions should be
considered material. State law provisions governing specific application procedures, building
licenses, taxation, the minimum wage, and other disparate aspects of bank operation all significantly affect creditors' ultimate yields on credit-card transactions. They are preconditional provisions given that they come into play even when a default does not occur. But
maintaining that all such state law provisions deal with interest, no matter how slight the
nexus between such provisions and interest rates, could not have been the intent of Congress
in enacting the NBA or the DIDA. Therefore, although all state law provisions dealing with
contingent occasions of default should be considered immaterial, it must be left as an open
question which individual state law provisions dealing with preconditional aspects of credit
transactions are material. In sum, what is recommended is treating the fact that a state law
provision comes into effect only on contingent occasions of default as a sufficient, though not
a necessary, condition for that provision to escape preemption.
This means that the interest-penalty distinction approach does not provide a complete
solution to the problem of delineating the proper preemptive scope of NBA § 85 and DIDA
§ 521. The distinction, however, does provide the courts, the OCC, banks, and consumers
with an initial and firm foothold in dealing with the issue.
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This failure to eliminate every conceivable obstacle to achieving
lender parity, however, does not mean that drawing the line between preconditional and contingent charges poses an illegitimate
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the objectives of
the NBA and the DIDA. First, complete lender parity can be
achieved only if national and FDIC-insured state banks are governed by exactly the same set of regulations as the most favored
state lenders. Yet, as arguments in the preceding section showed,
the all-or-nothing approach is simply unacceptable. The linedrawing problem cannot be avoided.
Second, any conflict that might be implicated by the interestpenalty distinction would be very slight. With respect to all state
consumer-credit-protection provisions governing the terms, compliance with which is preconditional to credit extensions, the interestpenalty distinction approach allows complete lender parity between
national and FDIC-insured banks, on the one hand, and the most
favored state lenders on the other. State consumer-creditprotection laws are left intact and may create lender disparity only
on contingent occasions of borrower default. Given that complete
lender parity cannot be achieved124 and that there is no evidence to
suggest that Congress meant to preempt all state banking or
consumer-credit-protection laws,125 it follows that Congress was
willing to tolerate and even anticipated such minimal amounts of
conflict.
The Supreme Court's conflict preemption jurisprudence buttresses this conclusion. The Court in the past has sustained state
laws erecting slight barriers to the full efficacy of federal statutes
when those state laws were aimed at promoting genuine and substantial interests of the states. For example, in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, 126 the Court found that California's moratorium on
construction of new nuclear-power plants conflicted with the
Atomic Energy Act's intent to promote commercial uses of nuclear
energy. Yet, judging the California moratorium as based on economic rather than safety reasons, the Court went on to hold that
Congress did not intend to promote nuclear power "at all costs. " 127
In this and other cases,128 the Supreme Court has displayed its will124. See supra section IV.B.
125. See supra Part III; see also Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 29 {"There is no
evidence that Congress meant to displace all the protective aspects of state rate laws when it
provided for the extension of most favored lender status.").
126. 461 U.S. 190 {1983).
127. 461 U.S. at 222.
128. Similarly, in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440
U.S. 519 (1978), the Court sustained the New York strike-insurance program that paid unemployment compensation to striking employees and imposed the costs for financing such bene-
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ingness to sustain state laws aimed at the promotion of genuine and
substantial state interests despite some slight conflicts with the federal statutes involved.129
In sum, the possibility of minimal conflicts implicated by the
proposed solution based on the interest-penalty distinction should
be tolerated given states' genuine and substantial interests in protecting credit consumers. In fact, it can be inferred from the unacceptability of the all-or-nothing approach that Congress did not
intend to achieve complete lender parity "at all costs."
D. Two Possible Objections to the Interest-Penalty Distinction
Two possible objections should be addressed briefly. First, one
may object that the interest-penalty distinction approach would enable a state to discriminate against national and "foreign" meaning, "out-of-state" - banks by artfully labeling certain fees as
"contingent" and allowing only the banks chartered by it to charge
such fees. The original intent of Congress in enacting the NBA
thereby would be frustrated. Recently, the California Supreme
Court accepted this line of argument in holding that section 85 of
the NBA preempted state law provisions prohibiting credit-card
late fees.130
This worry, however, is an idle one. A state in fact can treat its
most favored lenders and banks in general differently with respect
to contingent fees. A state, however, cannot favor banks chartered
by it over banks chartered by the federal government or another
state. Any state law that favored its own banks and discriminated
fits primarily on the struck employers. The Court observed that the New York law conflicted
with the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act to forbid state regulation of economic
warfare between labor and management by altering the balance in the collective-bargaining
relationship but held that Congress had decided to tolerate such a conflict. See 440 U.S. at
527.
129. In fact, some commentators have observed that the Supreme Court balances the
federal and state interests in its preemption analyses. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 20, at
297-98; Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. RE.v. 208, 220 {1959) ("[T]he Court has adopted the same weighing of interests approach
in pre-emption cases that it uses to determine whether a state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce."). This thesis finds perhaps its best confirmation in capital Cities cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 {1988). In that case, the Court did not end its analysis after noting
that the Oklahoma law prohibiting television advertising of alcoholic beverages conflicted
with the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) prohibition of any local regulation of
signals carried by cable-television systems. See 467 U.S. at 704-05. Instead, the Court attempted to reconcile the Oklahoma law with the FCC regulations and ultimately found preemption only after determining that Oklahoma's interest in regulating television advertising
was of "modest nature," whereas the FCC had a much more substantial interest in preserving
uniform national communications policy with respect to cable systems. See 467 U.S. at 71316.
130. See Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 900 P.2d 690, 700 (Cal. 1995), cert. granted, No. 95-860,
1996 WL 18433 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996); see also Jeremy Rosenblum, Exporting Annual Fees, 41
Bus. LAW. 1039, 1042 (1986) (posing the same objection considering annual fees to be outside
the scope of interest as that term is used in NBA § 85).
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against national or foreign banks would be a paradigm example of
state behavior proscribed by the Dormant Commerce Clause.131 A
state law's escape from the clutches of preemption does not guarantee its safety from other constitutional constraints.
Second, one may object to the interest-penalty distinction by appealing to the OCC's interpretive letters. In occasional interpretive
letters, the OCC has stated that NBA section 85 preempted state
laws regulating late fees on credit-card transactions.132 Many courts
have relied on these and other OCC interpretive letters in deciding
the preemption issue.133 It then may be argued that the OCC's declaring credit-card late fees to be material to the determination of
the interest rate indicates that state law provisions prohibiting
credit-card late fees conflict with the national policy regarding
interest-rate regulation.
The OCC's interpretive letters, however, merit very little weight
on the issue of preemption. In I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 134 the
Supreme Court held that deference to or reliance on an administrative agency's interpretation is misplaced when "a pure question of
statutory construction" is involved.135 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court
drew a distinction between the narrow issue of ascertaining congressional intent and the broader issue of how the statute should be
131. See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense ofthe Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Daniel A. Farber,
State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Letter from Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel (Feb. 17, 1995), available in
LEXIS, BANKING Library, aCCUL File; Letter from William P. Bowden, Jr., Chief Counsel (Feb. 4, 1992), available in LEXIS, BANKING Library, aCCUL File (stating that Iowa's
law governing credit-card late fees is preempted by § 85); Letter from Robert Serino, ace,
Deputy Chief Counsel (Policy) (Aug. 11, 1988), available in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 85,676, at 78,063 (ace Interpretive Letter No. 452).
As part of its attempt to revise and reorganize 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, the ace recently has
proposed an interpretive ruling to include late fees and other default charges in the definition
of interest under NBA § 85. The proposed § 7.4001(a) states:
The word "interest" as used in 12 U.S.C. 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for any extension of credit, the making available of a line of
credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was
extended. It includes, among other things, the following fees . . . numerical periodic
rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance
fees, and membership fees.
60 Fed. Reg. 11,940 (1995) (emphasis apded).
133. See, e.g., Spellman v. Meridian Bank, No. 94-3203, No. 94-3204, No. 94-3215, No. 943216, No. 94-3217, No. 94-3218, 1995. U.S. App. LEXIS 37149, at *20-21 (3d Cir. Dec. 29,
1995); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachussets, 971 F.2d 818, 830 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1052 (1993); Ament v. PNC Natl. Bank, 849 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (W.D. Pa. 1994);
Tikkanen v. Citibank, N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D. Minn. 1992); Smiley v. Citiban~, N.A.,
900 P2d 690, 702 (Cal.1995), cert. granted, No. 95-860, 1996 WL 18433 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996);
Harris v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 737 (Ct. App. 1994); Sherman v.
Citibank, N.A., 640 A.2d 325, 330 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), revd., 1995 N.J. LEXIS
1355 (1995).
134. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
135. See 480 U.S. at 446-48.
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applied and held that the former issue falls "well within the province of the Judiciary."136
The issue at stake here is the narrow one of determining what
Congress meant in NBA section 85 by employing the terms interest
and interest rate. It is therefore safe to conclude that the OCC's
interpretive letters are of very limited authoritative value and that
they are, as two commentators have said, "at best informal agency
staff advice [that] ... [is] not binding on courts."137
CONCLUSION

Taking advantage of the environment created by the most favored lender doctrine and the exportation doctrine of Marquette,
credit-card-issuing banks have aggressively conducted their nationwide consumer-credit transactions from a few states - such as
Delaware, Nebraska, and South Dakota - that have raised or removed interest-rate and fee ceilings. In doing so, many banks have
ignored the consumer-credit-protection laws of other states, and
consumers have been denied the protection that their elected legislators have seen fit to confer on them. The foregoing analysis, however, shows that such disregard of state consumer-credit-protection
laws, at least with respect to the charging of late fees on credit-card
transactions, is unjustified. Neither NBA section 85 nor DIDA section 521 preempts state law provisions regulating late fees on creditcard transactions.
Perhaps the best justification for the present regulatory scheme
can be found in the idea that consumers, in the long run, will benefit from a truly national banking system and open competition
among banks unhindered by local and anachronistic constraints.138
136. 480 U.S. at 448.
137. Arnold & Rohner, supra note 4, at 8 n.22.
138. Recently, there indeed has been a growing trend toward the nationalization of banking law. As one commentator has pointed out, a competitively restricted and geographically
limited banking system is giving way to one marked by intense competition and interstate
banking. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1987).
The DIDA, after all, is a step contributing to that trend. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 6894
(1980) ("On the competition theme, [the DIDA] marks an historic tum .... It relies more on
the forces of the marketplace and less on the forces of regulation in shaping the structure of
our financial system." (statement of Sen. Proxmire)). In 1994, Congress enacted the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994)
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)), signed by President Clinton on September 29, 1994; it
aimed to facilitate interstate branching. By doing away with the last arcane banjers that had
been posed by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the new law enables healthy banks
to acquire branches in other states and thus create truly multistate operations. Moreover, the
President, the Comptroller, and many in the banking industry have suggested that the new
law is only the first sign of the things to come. See Robert M. Garsson, President Clinton
Signs Interstate Bill into Law, Saying It's a First Step, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File; Robyn Meredith, Comptroller Vows Close Watch on
Local Needs Under Interstate, AM. BANKER, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Li-
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Yet, some studies indicate that the bank-credit-card industry has
not been a paradigm of the free market at work. The bank-creditcard market has all the attributes that usually lead to the creation of
a perfectly competitive market. For example, there are many sellers and buyers; there are no significant sunk costs or barriers to
entry; and there is no evidence of any collusion on price or quantity.139 Despite these facts, credit-card interest rates have proved to
be remarkably "sticky" and banks continue to reap "supranormal"
profits from their credit-card operations - three to five times the
overall profit rate in banking.140 In 1994, for example, eight of the
top nine commercial banks, ranked by the return on their assets,
specialized in credit-card loans.141 One economist has suggested
that wishful thinking and self-deception on the part of consumers
chiefly explain the high level and "stickiness" of credit-card interest
rates. 142
One very clear indication of widespread consumer irrationality
is the fact that consumers are much more sensitive to increases in
annual fees than to similar increases in the interest rates. 143 This
fact has not escaped commercial banks. Taking notice of consumer
resistance to annual fees and even some recent resistance to high
interest rates, banks have turned to other, subtler, methods of generating revenue. 144 Charging late fees has been the most obvious
and widespread of the new methods. 145 Banks also have resorted to
changing interest-calculation methods to charge interest as of the
date a purchase is made, rather than as of the date a purchase is
charged to a customer's account for payment, increasing over-thebrary, ASAPII File. "Most recently, the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin, has advocated repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 78, 377, 378 (1994), to allow
commercial banks to merge with investment banks. See Tim Carrington, Glass-Steagall Act
Targeted by Clinton for Elimination, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A2; George Graham, U.S.
Bank Reform Clears First Hurdle, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 1995, at 4; George Graham & Richard
Waters, Rubin Puts Forward Banking Reform Plan, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at 7. See generally Edward D. Sullivan, Glass-Steagall Update: Proposals to Modernize the Structure of the
Financial Services Industry, 112 BANKING L.J. 977 (1995).
139. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81
AM. EcoN. REv. 50 (1991).
140. See id. at 56-64.
141. See Peter Passell, A Mystery Bankers Love: How Do Credit Cards Stay So Projita·
ble?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1995, at C2.
142. See Ausubel, supra note 139, at 69-72. Ausubel's study shows that a sizeable percentage of consumers who borrow on credit cards are unaware of how often they do it and
that many do not even admit, to others and the1nselves, when they do it. See id. at 72.
143. Id.
144. See Henry Gilgoff, Pay Now or Pay Later, With Late Fees, NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 1993,
at49; Susan Harrigan, Banks Seek to Boost Credit Card Revenues, NEWSDAY, May l, 1988, at
82; Kerry ElizabetlI Knobelsdorff, Consumers Pay in State-vs.-State Credit Card War, CHRIS·
TIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 26, 1988, at 18.
145. According to one set of data, between 1987 and 1992, the percentage of commercial
banks charging late fees increased from 50 to 80%. See Gilgoff, supra note 144, at 49.
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credit-limit fees, and adding fees to customers' balances for interest
calculation.146 Credit-card-issuing banks thus have sought to circumvent what little benefit consumers have derived from competition. It must be questioned whether competition alone can provide
effective checks on such subtle methods of revenue generation.147
In the foregoing Parts, this Note argued that Congress, neither in
enacting NBA section 85 nor in enacting DIDA section 521, intended competition to be the only source of checks on such
methods.

146. See Harrigan, supra note 144, at 82.
147. Some studies by psychologists suggest that people generally evaluate their prospective actions in terms of a "minimal account," which includes only the direct consequences of
the considered actions. Such a simplified method of evaluation has the advantage of reducing cognitive strain. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456-57 (1981 ). This paradigm would mean that consumers, in evaluating different credit-card programs, generally would compare them based on
annual fees and interest rates but not on fees they would be liable for in contingent occasions
of default.

